Abstract
This study explores the use of propaganda by the Russian Federation as a cyber-enabled tool of state influence, framing it within the realist tradition of international relations theory. Drawing on peerreviewed literature, official investigations, and institutional reports from bodies such as the ODNI, NATO StratCom, EU DisinfoLab, and Graphika, the analysis traces the institutional framework, operational methods, and strategic objectives underpinning these campaigns. The discussion encompasses examples such as the 2016 U.S. election interference, the Ukraine conflict, COVID-19 disinformation, and efforts to destabilise the European Union, showing how informational influence serves both tactical goals, including narrative penetration and virality, and strategic aims, such as societal polarisation, erosion of democratic trust, and promotion of alternative governance models. What was found suggests that while direct causal impacts on behaviour are challenging to quantify, Russian propaganda achieves persistent strategic utility by fostering uncertainty, exploiting social divisions, and advancing narratives aligned with Moscow’s geopolitical objectives. From a realist perspective, these operations exemplify the rational pursuit of national power through non-military means, reaffirming that in an anarchic international system, influence is often secured through manipulation, ambiguity, and asymmetry rather than consensus or persuasion.